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The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, which led to
a collapse of trust in credit markets. In particular, the repurchase agreement market in the U.S., estimated
to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. banking system ($10 trillion), became
very illiquid during the crisis due to the fear of counterparty default, leaving lenders with illiquid bonds
that they did not want, believing that they could not be sold. As a result, there was an increase in repo
haircuts (the initial margin), causing massive deleveraging. I investigate this indirectly, by looking
at the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. The ABX.HE
indices of subprime mortgage-backed securities are derivatives linked to the underlying subprime
bonds. Introduced in 2006, the indices aggregated and revealed information about the value of the
subprime mortgage-backed securities and allowed parties to buy protection against declines in subprime
value via credit derivatives written on the index or tranches of the index. When the ABX prices plummeted,
the arbitrage relationships linking the credit derivatives linked to the index and the underlying bonds
broke down because liquidity evaporated in the repo market. This breakdown allows a glimpse of
the information problems that led to illiquidity in the repo markets, and the extent of the demand for
protection against subprime risk.
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The credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing prices failed to rise, 
which then led to a collapse of trust in credit markets.  To shed light on this, I investigate the 
relationship between two markets, one for cash securities and one synthetic.  The first market is 
the repurchase market, estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the U.S. 
banking system.  This market has grown to play a crucial intermediation role for asset-backed 
and mortgage-backed securities, especially as the intermediation has shifted out of the traditional 
banking sector. The other market is the synthetic market for subprime residential mortgage risk, 
which can be traded via the ABX.HE indices, derivatives linked to underlying subprime bonds. 
The ABX indices played several important roles in the panic. Starting in January 2006, the 
indices were the only place where a subprime-related instrument traded in a transparent way, 
aggregating and revealing information about the value of subprime residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS). Other subprime-related instruments, RMBS bonds, Collateralized Debt 
Obligation tranches, Structured Investment Vehicles’ liabilities, and so on, do not trade in visible 
markets and there are no secondary markets.  See Gary Gorton (2008).  Also, the ABX allowed 
for hedging subprime risk.  These two markets are linked by an arbitrage relationship, but this 
breaks down during the crisis, an indication of the disappearance of the repo market for 
subprime-related instruments. 
During the panic, and continuing today, the repo market shrank dramatically, drying up 
completely for subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), because of 
counterparty risk. The inability to buy or sell the underlying subprime bonds, combined with the 
overwhelming demand for hedging via derivatives linked to the ABX can be seen in the “basis,” 
the difference in spreads between the ABX index and the underlying cash bonds. Though there   2
 
are frictions, the basis should be small, but it explodes during the panic, an indication of the 
disappearance of the repo market for these bonds. 
I.  The ABX Indices and the Panic 
The panic, starting in 2007, is described by Gorton (2008). Subprime mortgages featured 
a unique security design that depended on home price appreciation; the mortgages were 
essentially short maturity, requiring refinancing. In 2006 and 2007 a total of $1.2 trillion of 
subprime mortgages were originated, of which 80 percent was securitized. The securitization of 
subprime mortgages also had a unique design, reflecting the home price sensitivity of the 
mortgages, and involving a dynamic build-up of credit enhancement as the underlying mortgages 
refinanced, paying cash into the securitization. Rated tranches of subprime securitizations were 
sold into collateralized debt obligations, tranches of which were in turn sold to structured 
investment vehicles, and so on. This chain of linked structured securities depended on house 
prices, and the final location of these risks – the end investors – are not known. 
As long as house prices appreciated, subprime mortgages could be refinanced, and the 
various structured securities linked to subprime mortgages were attractive investments.  House 
price appreciation was positive over the period when subprime mortgages were issued in 
significant amounts, roughly starting in 2000, through 2006.  In some of those years, the 
appreciation was very high, e.g., house prices grew almost 19 percent in 2005 and 15 percent in 
2006.  But, prices turned down in 2006.  Looking back now we can see that the annual rate 
change in August 2007, from the previous August, was minus 14 percent. 
The house price data is calculated with a lag.  So, when house prices started to drop, it 
not immediately known, now was it possible to determine the extent of the impact on subprime-
related securities, and off-balance sheet vehicles’ liabilities. There are no secondary markets for   3
 
                                                           
securitization tranches, collateralized debt obligation liabilities, or the liabilities of other 
structured vehicles, such as structured investment vehicles. As discussed by Gorton (2008), an 
important part of the information story in the panic was the introduction of new synthetic indices 
of subprime risk, traded over-the-counter. The ABX.HE 06-1 (“ABX”) (this is the official name 
for the 2006 first vintage), launched by dealer banks, began trading on January 19, 2006.
1 
The ABX Index is a credit derivative referencing an (initially) equally-weighted index 
linked to twenty subprime residential mortgage securitization transactions that were issued in the 
prior six months.  A new vintage of the ABX and subindices is issued every six months. The 
twenty subprime securitization transactions specified must have settled within the last six 
months, have a minimum deal size of $500 million, have a maximum average FICO score of 
660, and must meet other criteria, as well.
2  In addition to the main index, there are five 
subindices which reference different tranches of the same twenty securitization transactions, 
where each subindex references tranches with the same rating category, e.g., the ABX 06-1 
BBB- index refers to the equally-weighted index of the twenty BBB- tranches from the twenty 
transactions that were originated in the second half of 2005. 
The ABX indices trade based on the price, for a fixed coupon.  The initial coupon is 
determined at the launch of each ABX.HE index based on an average quote from a survey of the 
market makers, the dealer banks. Subsequently, trades require an upfront exchange of 
premium/discount relative to “par.” In a typical transaction, a protection buyer pays the 
protection seller a fixed coupon at a monthly rate on an amount determined by the buyer.  An 
investor wanting to hedge subprime risk or otherwise establish a short credit position using the 
 
1 So, unfortunately, there are no observations on early index subprime product, such as the 2005 vintage.  Moreover, 
no vintages were issued after 2007-01. 
2 See “Index Methodology for the ABX.HE Index for the Sub-Prime House Equity Sector,” Markit (2008).   4
 
index (known as the “protection buyer”), is required to pay a monthly coupon to the other party 
(the “protection seller”). The payment is calculated based on the outstanding notional amount of 
the index and a fixed.  In exchange for the payment, the protection buyer in an ABX index 
contract is compensated by the protection seller when any interest or principal shortfalls or write-
downs on the underlying mortgages affect the constituent RMBS 
When a credit event occurs, the protection seller makes a payment to the protection buyer 
in an amount equal to the loss. There is no physical settlement.  Credit events include the 
shortfall of interest or principal as well as the write-down of the tranche due to losses on the 
underlying mortgage loans. 
With the advent of the ABX indices, market participants could, for the first time, express 
views about the value of subprime bonds, by buying or selling protection.  For the first time 
information about subprime values and risks was aggregated and revealed.  In 2007 the ABX 
prices plummeted. This is shown below for the BBB- ABX indices referencing subprime risks 
from the first half of 2006 and the second half of 2006, as explained below.  The common 
knowledge created, in a volatile way, ended up with the demand for protection pushing ABX 
prices down.  The ABX information together with the lack of information about location of the 
risks led to a loss of confidence on the part of banks in the ability of their counterparties to honor 
contractual obligations.  The panic was on, starting with a run on structured investment vehicles; 
see Gorton (2008). 
 
 













II.  The ABX-Cash Basis 
  ABX prices are an accurate reflection of the risk of the underlying subprime bonds to the 
extent that an arbitrage relationship between the index and the cash instruments that the index 
references holds.  Define “the basis” for a given cash instrument as the credit default swap 
(CDS) spread minus the spread on the cash bond for that name or tranche.  So the basis is 
negative when the cash spread is wider than the CDS spread and it is positive basis when the 
CDS spread is wider than the cash spread.  To fix ideas, think of the ABX index as referencing 
one BBB subprime bond, for simplicity. Imagine an investor who compares the market spread on 
the BBB subprime tranche (expressed as an annual percentage), Scash, to the spread on the ABX 
index referencing that same bond, SCDS (also expressed as an annual percentage).  The basis is 
SCDS – Scash.  So, SCDS < Scash is a negative basis, and vice versa.  The cash instrument has to be 
funded, so the difference SCDS – Scash should equal the cost of funding, say RCF.  Intuitively, the   6
 
ngest time series. 
                                                           
arbitrage should work as follows.  If SCDS – Scash is less than RCF, then an arbitrageur should buy 
the bond and buy protection on the bond via the ABX index, thereby eliminating the credit risk, 
and earning a return greater than RCF.  If SCDS – Scash is greater than RCF, then the arbitrageur 
should short the risk bond and write protection via the ABX instrument, again earning the 
difference.  For details, see, e.g., Darrell Duffie (1999). This suggests that SCDS – Scash should 
equal RCF; the cost of funding is discussed further below. 
  I examine the basis with daily spread data from a dealer bank.  The ABX index prices 
were converted to spreads by the bank.
3  The subprime bonds are floating rate.  The bank 
collects spreads for primary issuance or secondary spreads if these are observed. The subprime 
spreads series end after February 7, 2008 because of a lack of trading. The subprime bond 
spreads are not the exact bonds referenced by the ABX index because these did not trade. But, 
the arbitrage could be conducted using on-the-run subprime bonds that were reasonable 
substitutes. I focus on the BBB tranche of the ABX index, and also look at the 2006-01 vintage 
because this is the lo
Figure 2 shows the basis for the BBB tranche of the ABX index during its first year of 
existence. The basis moves within a fairly narrow range, varying between 34 and -22 basis 
points, a fairly tight range.  The basis should be compared to the cost of funding (or the amount 
earned), which is the repo rate.  For example, suppose LIBOR is 3.1 percent.  Suppose, in the 
repo market, that the haircut for this bond is 10 percent and that the repo rate is LIBOR plus 10 
 
3  The dealer bank’s  methodology for computing ABX spreads is, briefly, as follows: (1) the bank uses their   
proprietary model to project prepays/defaults/losses/durations, etc, using base case home price appreciation   
assumption (-15% 1yr, -3% 1yrs, 0% 2yrs, +3% rest); (2) The bank uses the risky duration computed above, along 
with the market price (to get upfront payment) and the constant coupon to obtain the par spread for the index.  So, 
the parameters for the spread computations are: the upfront premiums (market observed); the ABX coupon, which is 
constant); and the risky duration, which is computed from the proprietary model computed.  Roughly, the equation 
used is:  Spread = (Upfront / Risky Duration) + ABX Coupon.   7
 
basis points.  Then, in a negative basis trade, for a bond priced at $100, the cost of funding is 
($100 – ($100*10%))*(LIBOR +10 bp) = $90*3.2%= $2.88. 
 
To complete the example, if the bond pays LIBOR plus 100 basis points (bps) and the cost of 
protection is 60 bps, then the income on the transaction is $100*(3.1%+100-60) = $3.5.  So, 
initially the arbitrage appears profitable.  The example shows how the repo market is crucial to 
keeping the basis narrow. 
III.   The Repo Market 
Repo is likely one of the largest financial markets, although there are no official statistics 
on the size of the market.  Repo is integral to intermediation by dealer banks because when assets 
are purchased for sale later the assets are financed by repo.  Repos are essentially secured loans, 
so counterparty risk is usually not an issue. According to Timothy Geithner (2008), tripartite   8
 
repo was $2.5 trillion in 2007.
4 Tripartite repo is estimated to be about 15 – 20 percent of the 
repo market
5, making the total market about $12 trillion (including repo and reverse repo), 
compared to total assets in the U.S. banking system of $10 trillion (see Geithner 2008).   
Figure 3 shows the ABX 2006-01 BBB basis from inception through January 1, 2008, the 




















Figure 3: ABX BBB Cash Basis
 
basis explodes at the end of July 2007, which reflects a number of factors.  First, financing in the 
repo market became very expensive and disappears for some asset classes, like subprime bonds.  
Second, the plummeting ABX prices revealed the decline in value of subprime bonds, leading to 
massive demands for hedging, reflected in the low ABX prices and high spreads.  Figure 2 
provides a glimpse of the liquidity crisis, which was coincident with the fall in house prices and 
                                                            
4 In tripartite repo a custodian bank or clearing organization acts as an intermediary between the two repo parties.  
There is no data that I know of that quantifies the amount of bilateral repo. 
5 Private communication from a repo trader.  
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ABX prices.  ABX spreads widened much more than cash spreads.  And this explosive behavior 
of the basis is consistent with perceived changes in the repo market in the summer of 2007, 
particularly in August 2007.  
Table 1 shows the repo market haircuts for different collateral at different points in time.  
Of particular relevance are the first two columns of the table. The implications of this are very 
dramatic.  Imagine a firm that is levered 30:1, by borrowing in the repo market.  If the haircut 
doubles, or goes from zero to a positive amount, the required deleveraging is massive!  Most 
investment banks were levered 30:1, equivalent to about a 3 percent haircut.  If the haircut rises 
to 6 percent, at least half the assets will have to be sold. 
Another sign of trouble is a “repo fail.” A “repo fail” occurs when one side of the 
agreement fails to abide by the contract.
6  Table 2 shows repo fails by primary government 
security dealers, greatly exceeding previous episodes of stress in the repo market. 
Table 2: Repo Fails by Primary U.S. Government Security Dealers 
(For the week ended October 1, 2008; $ billions) 
Type of Security  Fails to Receive  Fails to Deliver 
U.S. Treasury Securities  $2,498 $2,292 
Federal Agency and Government-





Mortgage-backed Securities  $39 $37 
Corporate Securities  $25 $41 
Source: Government Securities Dealer Statistics Unit, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
What happened in the repo market?  Dealer banks would not accept collateral because 
they rightly believed that if they had to seize the collateral, should the counterparty fail, then 
there would be no market in which to sell it.  This was due to the absence of buyers because of 
the deleveraging. This led to an absence of prices for these securities.  If that value cannot be 
                                                            
6 This event is not considered a contractual default in the repo market.  See Michael Fleming and Kenneth Garbade 
(2005). Table 1:  Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market Haircuts during the Crisis* 
  Source: Repo trader. 
Asset Class** 
July '07  
Pre-Crisis 
Late July-
August  Q3 2007  Q4 2007  Q1 2008  Q2 2008  Q2--> Current* 
Corporates A-AA rated   0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0%  0% 
Corporates BBB rated  0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0-5%  0-5% 
Corporates < BBB- 
rated   0% 0% 0% 0%  0%  0-5%  0-5% 
ABS AA-AA *  0% 2-5%  3-7%  5-10% 10-15% 15-20% 20-25% 
ABS BBB-AA  0% 3-7%  5-10%  10-15%  15-20% 20-25%  20-30%+ 
ABS < BBB  0-2%  5-10%  10-15%  15-20%  20-25%  No financing  No financing 
CLO, Other AA-AAA  0% 2-5%  3-7%  5-10% 10-15% 15-20% 15-25% 
CLO, Other BBB-AA  0% 3-7%  5-10%  10-15%  15-20% 20-25% 20-30% 
CLO, Other < BBB  0-2%  5-10%  10-15%  15-20%  20-25%  No financing  No financing 
CMO, Other AA-AAA  0% 3-7%  4-8%  5-10%+  15-20% 20-25%  20-30%+ 
CMO, Other BBB-AA  0% 5-10%  5-10%+  15-20% 20-25%  20-25%  No  financing 
CMO, Other < BBB  0-2%  5-10%  10-20%  20-25%  No financing  No financing  No financing 
CDO AA-AAA  0% 3-7%  5-10%  10-20%  15-20% 15-20% 15-20% 
CDO BBB-AA  0% 5-10%  10-15%  15-25% 20-30%  25-30%  No  financing 
CDO < BBB  0-2%  10%+  15-20%  25-30%  No financing  No financing  No financing 
  * As of September 15, 2008. 
Notes:  Haircut ranges are for average terms of 1-3 months for inter-dealer or investment-grade major market participants.  All 
haircuts are approximations and vary by specific counterparty.  Distressed inter-dealer names are subject to higher initial 
haircuts or cannot access financing.  Asset classes listed as “No financing” are not repo-able. 
**ABS = asset-backed securities; CLO = collateralized loan obligation; CMO = collateralized mortgage obligation; CDO = 
collateralized debt obligation.   11
 
determined, because there is no market – no liquidity – or there is the concern that if the asset is 
seized by the lender, it will not be saleable at all, then the lender will not engage in repo. Repo 
traders report that there was uncertainty about whether to believe the ratings on these structured 
products, and in a very fast moving environment, the response was to pull back from accepting 
anything structured. If no one would accept structured products for repo, then these bonds could 
not be traded – and then no one would want to accept them in repo transactions. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The decline in the ABX prices revealed the shock to the valuation of subprime risk, but it 
did not reveal where these risks resided. That uncertainty caused a loss of confidence in credit. 
This can be seen in the breakdown in the arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the 
panic. The explosive behavior of the basis shows that the concern about the location of the risks 
led to fear of counterparty default, especially in the repo markets, where defaults would lead to 
delivery of bonds that could not be sold.  These problems in the repo market are very significant 
because the repurchase agreement market in the U.S. is estimated to be $12 trillion, larger than 
the total assets in the U.S. banking system. This market is central to the “shadow banking 
system,” the nexus of structured vehicles that issues bonds into the capital markets (see Gorton 
2008).  This short-term financing market became very illiquid during the crisis and an increase in 
repo haircuts (the initial margin) caused massive deleveraging. If no one would accept structured 
products for repo, then these bonds could not be traded – and then no one would want to accept 
them in a repo transaction.  This externality is reminiscent of Marco Pagano (1989).  The 
extreme stress in the repo market can even be seen in the repo market for U.S. government 
securities, where the instances of “repo fails” where borrowed securities have not been returned 
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